An earlier version of this proposal made promises it had no business making
and used examples it had not properly checked. We have stripped them out.
Here is what changed, and why — so you can see the work, not just the
tidied result.
01
No fixed financial returns. None.
Earlier draft said
5% annual dividends and a 15-year payback, secured by a first mortgage.
What we say now
We do not promise returns. Offering fixed dividends or secured first-mortgage
positions to community members would put us into territory regulated by
ASIC under the Corporations Act — territory that is not appropriate
for an early-stage community proposal, and that would expose members to
risks they should not have to underwrite.
02
A co-op cannot hold the liquor licence directly.
Earlier draft assumed
the co-op would simply “hold the licence” like any other operator.
What we say now
Tasmanian liquor law requires a licence to be held by a natural person.
That means a publican or licensee — an individual — has to hold it, with
a legal relationship to the co-op. This is solvable, but it is a
structural design problem we owe the community an honest answer on
before any vote.
03
Investors don’t get reserved board seats.
Earlier draft proposed
extra board seats and weighted voting for larger contributors.
What we say now
Australian co-operative law is built on one member, one vote.
Reserving board seats by financial contribution, or weighting votes by
dollars, would conflict with the core legal definition of a co-operative.
If we want a co-op, we play by co-op rules.
04
Some “case studies” don’t actually apply.
Earlier draft cited
Mondragón, The Old Crown, and other community-ownership stories as if
they mapped neatly onto a Tasmanian village pub.
What we say now
They don’t. Mondragón is a multi-billion-euro Spanish industrial
federation. The Old Crown’s situation is different from ours in scale,
jurisdiction, and trading history. We will only put forward case studies
once they’ve been properly verified by someone with no stake in this idea.
05
“Forever” overstates the asset lock.
Earlier draft said
the pub “can never be sold or stripped for profit” and would
“belong to Cygnet, forever.”
What we say now
That overclaims what an Australian co-operative can guarantee. A
non-distributing co-op under the Co-operatives National Law has a real
asset lock — surplus stays in the enterprise — but the co-op can still
be wound up under specific procedures, and supermajority thresholds
and community-purpose successor clauses are designed safeguards, not
eternity. The honest commitment is “the rules can be drafted to make
selling out very hard, on community terms” — not “forever.”
06
“Membership” isn’t a one-off donation.
Earlier draft implied
that anyone who paid the joining fee got a vote and stayed a member.
What we say now
The Co-operatives National Law requires every co-op to have an
active-membership rule. The BCCM’s drafting guide frames this as
SMART — Simple, Measurable, Actionable, Reasonable, Timely. In
practice that means a real annual obligation: a minimum spend at the
pub, an annual subscription, or volunteer time. A member who stops
meeting the test legally loses their membership. “Pay once and
you’re in forever” would not satisfy the Registrar.
07
Sociocracy isn’t the right shape for a single-venue startup.
Earlier draft proposed
a multi-stakeholder sociocratic governance model — circles,
double-linking, worker-members alongside community-members, consent
decision-making.
What we say now
Sociocracy works for stable, mature, multi-site organisations.
Imposing it on a single-venue rural pub before it has traded a single
day risks administrative paralysis at exactly the moment the business
needs decisive operational leadership. We replace it with a small
elected board, a clear board-vs-management split, a professional
general manager, and advisory committees for specialist questions
(heritage, food, music) without voting power. More-participatory
governance can come later, once trading reality is in.
08
There is no Year-5 surplus to pre-allocate.
Earlier draft promised
Year-5 surplus split 40% reinvest / 30% community grants / 20%
rebates, plus a 25-year vision of scholarships, philanthropy and
climate-resilience projects.
What we say now
We have no surplus to allocate. Regional Australian hospitality is
brutal in years 1–3; survival is the only goal. Distributing
percentages of imaginary surplus to specific causes before a single
trading year is financially reckless and operationally inflexible.
The Co-operatives National Law constrains how any surplus can be
distributed (and the distributing-vs-non-distributing structural
choice determines the basics). Surplus-treatment policy is a
board-and-member decision after trading proves it’s
possible, not a marketing line at Stage 1.
09
Volunteers don’t run a commercial pub.
Earlier draft leaned on
volunteer working bees and “community labor” as part of the
operating model.
What we say now
Working bees, opening events, and ad-hoc community-asset
maintenance — fine. Volunteer hours substituting for paid labour in a
commercial hospitality operation is a Fair Work Act 2009 and
workers-compensation risk. The Fair Work Ombudsman’s tests on
volunteer-versus-employee classification are strict; misclassifying
an employee as a volunteer carries civil penalties under
ss.357–359 of the Act. The lawful boundary is clear: working bees
stay working bees, and operational shifts are paid shifts.