Document begins

Archive note — this document failed its own safety review, and the fixes were never applied

This is the project’s finance assumptions book: every number anyone used, with its source and a confidence label. It is the single most extractable document in the archive, and the project knew it.

In May 2026 an AI agent was pointed at this book in the role of financial model skeptic. It produced the capital model safety report, which rated the book MEDIUM risk and flagged eleven items — not because any of them was an offer, but because several figures are hedged correctly in place and would read as promises if lifted out.

Those recommended fixes were advisory and were never applied. The book below is the version that existed, with the flagged phrasings intact. Read the safety report alongside it; it names the exact lines and says what was wrong with each.

No number in this document was ever approved for external use, and none of it is an offer of anything. That was the book’s own standing caveat and it is reproduced below.

Finance Assumptions Book — Bottom Pub Co-op

Internal working document. Not for public release. Prepared: 18 May 2026. Stage 1: Gauging Interest. Author: Agent-generated from meeting transcript references, workplans, and published briefings. Requires steering committee review and sign-off before use in any modelling.

Preamble

This document is the assumptions register for any financial modelling the Bottom Pub Co-op project undertakes. Its job is narrow and specific: to collect every number currently in circulation — from the 17 May 2026 community meeting, from the published briefings on this project’s research site, and from analogous published sources — and label each one with its origin, its confidence level, and whether it can be used in a model as-is or whether it first requires professional confirmation.

This document is not a financial model, a business plan, a feasibility study, or an offer of any kind. It contains no projections, no forecast returns, no revenue targets, and no capital-raise terms. It contains only the raw inputs that a model would need, held at the confidence level they deserve. A number that appears here without a VERIFIED label is not ready for external use. A number that appears here as NEEDS-PROFESSIONAL-CONFIRMATION cannot enter a model at all until that confirmation is in hand.

Any person using this document in subsequent modelling work must cite it as a source, carry forward each figure’s confidence label, and not upgrade a label without recording why and on whose authority.

The project is at Stage 1: Gauging Interest. Nothing in this document constitutes a commitment, a financial offer, or a statement that the property is available for purchase. The property is subject to a receivership process; the appointed receivers are the relevant insolvency practitioner contact. No acquisition timeline is known.

Confidence Labels

Section 1: Acquisition

Every figure related to property purchase. None of the figures in this section have been independently verified. The property is in receivership; no publicly confirmed asking price exists as at 18 May 2026.

1.1 Previous buyer’s reported purchase price

1.2 Earlier reported offer figure

1.3 Implied acquisition price range for modelling

1.4 Stamp duty (transfer duty) estimate

1.5 Title structure — commercial building and residential land

1.6 Residential land value (if separable)

1.9 Title encumbrances — creditor caveats (INTERNAL — do not share publicly)

1.7 Land tax (ongoing)

1.8 Independent commercial valuation

1.9 Bridging finance for receivership acquisition

Section 1A: Heritage Status

Added from heritage_desktop_research.md (WP 4.2, 18 May 2026). These figures resolve meeting-transcript ambiguities.

1A.1 Heritage tier

1A.2 Heritage curtilage

1A.3 Statement of Significance

Section 1B: Funding Strategy — Modelled Cost Stack (Luzern Property Advisory, draft, June 2026)

Added 24 June 2026 from the Funding Strategy document. This is the first internally-modelled end-to-end cost breakdown the project has produced. It is not a feasibility study and not a professional costing.

Source: Funding Strategy & Action Items Co-op.pdf — Luzern Property Advisory, June 2026. Prepared by Luzern Property Advisory; the project’s public /people/ page carries the corresponding conflict-of-interest disclosure. Marked “Draft — for discussion only.” Document held in working group files (not in this repository).

Confidence mapping for this whole section: Every cost figure below is ESTIMATED (modelled draft) in this book’s vocabulary — the source document itself states the figures are “subject to significant refinement.” None are VERIFIED. None may be upgraded to FACT without professional sign-off (building surveyor, architect, quantity surveyor for works; accountant for purchasing/structure costs). Do not use any figure in this section in external or public communication. These figures sit alongside — not in place of — the meeting-reported acquisition range in §1.1–§1.3 and the meeting-reported renovation range in §2.1; where they differ, both are retained and the gap is flagged below.

1B.1 Modelled base cost stack

1B.2 Aspirational add-ons (NOT in the base case)

1B.3 Exclusivity deposit target

1B.4 Residential-land component and zoning — DISPUTED / UNCONFIRMED

This subsection exists to prevent a draft modelling assumption from overwriting a verified FACT already in this book.

Action to resolve: the residential-component figure cannot enter any model until the IM’s claim is reconciled with the title search — verify against survey plan SP163869 for registered lot dimensions (the area-flag in §6.2 already notes a cadastral-vs-heritage-curtilage discrepancy). Until then, the base cost stack in §1B.1 stands on its own and assumes no residential land-sale offset.

Section 2: Renovation and Capital Works

Every figure related to building works. The building is heritage-listed (Place ID 3472) and has not been independently inspected. No commissioned condition report exists. All figures in this section are meeting-reported or estimated — none are based on a commissioned assessment.

2.1 Total renovation range

2.2 Veranda

2.3 Upstairs rooms

2.4 Freezers and refrigeration

2.5 Kitchen

2.6 Outbuildings

2.7 Asbestos

2.8 BCA/DDA compliance upgrade costs

2.9 Heritage architect and pre-application fees

2.10 DA fees (Huon Valley Council)

2.11 Acoustic management plan

2.12 Independent building condition and structural assessment

2.13 Working capital and contingency

Section 3: Operating Costs

Recurring costs that would appear in a trading profit-and-loss account. Where a specific Tasmanian figure is available, it is cited. Where a category is identified but not yet priced, it is flagged as NEEDS-PROFESSIONAL-CONFIRMATION. All figures here are drawn from the feasibility briefing, the accounting briefing, and the legal/licensing briefing.

3.1 Staffing — Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2020

3.2 Payroll tax

3.3 Public liability insurance

3.4 Workers’ compensation (WorkCover Tasmania)

3.5 Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance

3.6 Building and contents insurance

3.7 RSA (Responsible Service of Alcohol) training

3.8 Food Safety Supervisor certification

3.9 Annual liquor licence fee

3.10 Food premises registration fee

3.11 Music licensing — APRA AMCOS and PPCA

3.12 Rates (Huon Valley Council)

3.13 Utilities (electricity, gas, water)

3.14 Income tax rate (corporate)

3.15 GST registration threshold

3.16 Professional governance and accounting costs

Section 4: Revenue Assumptions

Any figures about expected revenue, accommodation rates, or spend per head. All figures in this section are regional benchmarks, not site-specific projections. None of these figures constitute a revenue forecast for the Bottom Pub.

4.1 Tourism Tasmania regional accommodation benchmarks — Huon–Far South

4.2 Food and beverage revenue benchmarks

4.3 Comparable capital raised — Australian community pub precedents

These figures are drawn from verified case studies and serve as data points for member equity expectations. They are not revenue figures; they belong to the capital stack (Section 5) but are placed here for context alongside the revenue comparables.

Note: These are analogues, not projections. Comparability limitations apply — see case studies briefing. Cygnet is not Grong Grong; the Huon Valley is not regional NSW. Size, demographics, and building condition differ in all cases.

4.3A “81 cents in the dollar” local economic retention

4.4 UK community shares baseline (Plunkett UK)

Section 5: Capital Stack Assumptions

Any figures about the composition of funding. No capital instrument has been designed. No share offer is open. No Disclosure Statement has been drafted or approved. These are research findings about the instruments that exist and what they might contribute — not a fundraising plan.

5.0A Castlemaine Community Investment Co-operative — verified figures (updated 2026-05-18)

5.1 Member shares (CNL par-value)

5.2 Co-operative Capital Units (CCUs)

5.3 Bank debt — Bank Australia (impact lending)

5.4 SEFA (Social Enterprise Finance Australia)

5.5 Bendigo Community Bank Cygnet (grants only)

5.6 Equity Crowdfunding (CSF platforms — Birchal, Equitise, OnMarket)

5.7 Grant categories

5.8 Co-op formation and legal costs (one-off)

Section 6: Assumptions That Cannot Yet Be Populated

The following are financial inputs required for a viable model that are currently unknown. Each must be resolved through a specific process before the model can be built.

Section 7: Sensitivity Notes

This section is not a model. It uses only the figures already recorded in Sections 1–5 to identify where the project’s numbers have the highest leverage. The purpose is to flag, in plain language, which assumptions are most worth resolving first.

Purchase price is the dominant input. The gap between the meeting-reported figures ($1.3M and $1.6M) is $300,000. At 65% LVR, every $100,000 increase in purchase price requires an additional $35,000 from non-debt sources (member equity, grants, CCUs). A $300,000 gap requires $105,000 more in non-debt capital. This sensitivity applies before any renovations are considered. A project that is capitalised to work at $1.3M may not be capitalised to work at $1.6M without a material rethink of the equity raise.

Renovation scope is the second-largest input. The meeting-reported range is $900K–$1.2M, a spread of $300,000. But this range has no scope definition — it is not known whether it covers minimum viable opening or full renovation, whether it includes heritage compliance and BCA/DDA upgrades, or whether asbestos is included. A heritage project of this complexity routinely runs 20–30% over initial estimate. The “full renovation” scenario at the top of the range with a 30% contingency would imply capital works of approximately $1.56M — approaching the reported purchase price in total. The combined capital requirement (acquisition plus renovation at upper range with contingency) could reach $3M+, depending on scope. This has significant implications for member equity targets and debt serviceability.

Renovation timing drift has a compounding effect. The feasibility briefing identifies 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month delays as sensitivity scenarios. For a heritage project with dual-consent requirements (Heritage Council and Huon Valley Council), timeline delays are not hypothetical — the planning briefing advises budgeting 3–6 months from pre-application to permit grant for heritage adaptive reuse. Every month of delay incurs holding costs (loan interest on acquisition debt, building insurance, ongoing maintenance) and defers revenue. A 12-month delay to opening relative to plan is a standard heritage-project risk scenario.

Interest rate on debt is highly leveraged. At 7% p.a. versus 9% p.a. on a $1M senior debt facility, the difference in annual interest cost is $20,000. Over a 5-year term, that is $100,000 in additional carrying cost. The social finance briefing records that bridging finance may cost 1–1.5% per month — equivalent to 12–18% p.a. If bridging is required for a receivership acquisition, even a 6-month bridge on $1M of debt would cost $60,000–$90,000 in interest alone before any renovation work begins.

Staffing cost is the largest recurring operating input. Hospitality margins are notoriously thin, and the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2020 mandates penalty rates for weekend and public holiday work — days that are the highest-revenue periods for a community pub. A model that understates staffing cost by failing to apply correct Award rates will produce an unreliable break-even calculation. Hotel Theodore’s failure was attributed partly to escalating staffing costs combined with COVID-era disruption; this is not a theoretical risk.

The distributing vs non-distributing structure choice changes the capital stack materially. A non-distributing co-op can access grants that a distributing co-op cannot. If grants represent $200K–$400K of potential capital, and the project chooses a distributing structure that forecloses grant eligibility, the remaining capital sources must fill that gap. The choice is not a governance abstraction — it has direct dollar consequences. This is why workplans.md (Stream 3 task 3.2) calls for the model to be run under both structure scenarios.

The CSF incompatibility eliminates an otherwise large capital source. Birchal’s average raise in FY24 was approximately $661,000. That source is structurally unavailable to a CNL co-operative. If the community expects that equity crowdfunding is a viable capital pathway, the entity structure decision will disappoint that expectation unless the project opts for a non-CNL structure — with the governance and grant-eligibility trade-offs that entails.

End of Finance Assumptions Book. Version: 0.1 — draft for steering committee review. All figures should be re-checked against primary sources before any model is built. No number in this document has been approved for use in external or public communications.